Overview
• The Department of Defense (DoD) is transforming its organizational and operational structures to deal with today's complex and rapidly growing asymmetric challenges…
• Despite globalization and the telecommunications revolution, our military is still dependent upon on hierarchical, familiar, and very predictable 20th Century C2 methods and structures.
• National and strategic C2 uses a myriad of systems that are platform-centric and hardware-based.
• The problems and failures of past C2 systems and capabilities can provide valuable lessons learned for articulating the policies that will drive future C2 capabilities.
• In the early 1960s, the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis highlighted the need for better communications and for a more centralized, coherent, integrated and effective structure for managing military operations.
• President Kennedy called for.. "the creation of a command and control system that, while located in the Department of Defense, would be responsive to the needs of central decision makers and remain under ultimate civilian control at all times."
• The National Military Command System (NMCS) as "a framework for streamlining, modernizing, and centralizing command and control" resulted.
-Implicit in the NMCS was the requirement for a robust, survivable C2
Where We've Been -WWMCCS
• The NMCS was the principle subsystem of WWMCCS and the hub for a national level C2 structure.
-WWMCCS tied together already existing C2 systems including command posts, sensor systems, automated data processing systems and communications systems into a defense-wide mega-system.
• WWMCCS had serious inadequacies.
-Specifically, there was no clear definition of what WWMCCS was to accomplish, and there was a lack of clear cut responsibility.
The WWMCCS Council
• The organizational construct at the beginning for WWMCCS was "a centralized, top-down management structure focusing on the needs of the NCA as a priority for crisis management"… the "WWMCCS Council" was to:
-Provide general policy guidance to the JCS regarding the operation and future development of WWMCCS. -Resolve policy conflicts. -Review the results of system testing, signaling that effectiveness criteria would now be promulgated at the top rather than at the subunit level. -Facilitate work on a number of projects considered necessary for strategic command and control modernization. -Serve as a high-level advocate for these projects in future budget wars.
Efforts to Centralize C2 and Jointness
• In 1985, the Packard Commission recommended changes in three broad areas: planning and budgeting, defense acquisition and military organization and command.
• The Commission report led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 -a deliberate move in the direction of a more centralized C2 capability and to eliminate lack of jointness and the problems in C2 interoperability.
• WWMCCS was partially replaced in the mid 1990s with the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which promptly broke down into Service stovepipe implementations (GCCS-M, GCCS-AF, GCCS-A).
• On 9/11, the FAA, the White House and the NMCS each initiated multi-agency teleconferences, but none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the highjacking.
-The follow-on 9/11 Commission recognized this inadequacy as part of the underlying C2 problem.
